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James Comninellis
Reasoned Piety:
A summary and explication of discussion of one of 
al-Ghazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers
 There is perhaps no better way to open a paper on Abu Hāmid 
Muḥammad al-Ṭusī al-Ghazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers than 
to quote his opening prayer. It reveals both a man in search of the 
truth, devoted to his God and endowed with the skill to communicate it 
beautifully:
 We ask God in his majesty that transcends all bounds and His 
munificence that goes beyond all ends to shed upon us the lights 
of His guidance and to snatch away from us the darkness of 
waywardness and error; to make us among those who saw the truth 
as truth, preferring to pursue and follow its paths, and who saw 
the false as false, choosing to avoid and shun it. . . and that He may 
bestow His prayers and His assured peace upon our prophet, the 
chosen, Muhammad, the best of men, and upon his virtuous family 
and his companions pure, keys of guidance and lanterns in the 
darkness.1
  Ghazālī, born in 1058 in northeast Persia, grew to be one of 
the greatest minds of his time. A leading theologian educated him; 
and he mastered theology of al-Asharī at a young age. By his thirties, 
Ghazālī taught at the university of Baghdad—one of the most prestigious 
academic institutions of the time.2 A devoutly religious man, he 
1  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, trans. Michael E. Marmura 
(Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1997), 1.
2  W. Montgomery Watt, “Introduction,” in The Faith and Practice (London: 
George Allen and Unwin ltd., 1953), 11.
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considered God the source of all creation and the root of all causation.  
Yet, he came to question the validity of his knowledge and the motives 
of his success. Two intellectual crises drove Ghazālī to seek mystical 
understanding. In the first, he strove to find the validity of reason. He 
feared his senses misrepresented the world and voided his reasoning 
of it. He describes this in his autobiographical work, Deliverance from 
Error, saying, “I investigated the various kinds of knowledge I had, 
and found myself destitute of all knowledge. . .except in the case of 
sense-perception. . . .” 3 He concluded, however, that even sense cannot 
yield undeniable truth. After two months in this state, God restored 
peace to him. A second period of skepticism followed, in which Ghazālī 
determined that he achieved his worldly success for vainglory—rather 
than genuine religious impulse.4 
 In reaction, he wandered in isolated asceticism seeking divine 
intuition before returning to teaching. However, mysticism remained his 
focus in the latter part of his life—as is evident in his autobiography. In it 
he praises mystics as “men who had real experiences, not men of words. 
. . .”5 However, he always attempted to reconcile his mysticism with the 
tradition that worship practices of Islam developed.  Indeed, he opposed 
the philosophers in The Incoherence because their teachings violate the 
common practices of religion. Ghazālī died in 1111 but so impressed the 
world that some have called him “the greatest Muslim after Muhammad, 
and he is by no means unworthy of that dignity.”6
 The Incoherence is very specific both in purpose and scope. 
Ghazālī began and completed it in the 1090s. With the advent of Greek, 
specifically Aristotelian philosophy, new perspectives on religious 
practices developed. Ghazālī loathed the arrogance of those who assert 
philosophy as if it had some inherently elevated status over religious 
tradition and truth therein. He went so far as to accuse philosophy of 
encouraging compromise in the followers of God.7 The Incoherence meets 
3  Al-Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error, in The Faith and Practice, trans. W. 
Montgomery Watt (London: George Allen and Unwin ltd., 1953), 22.
4  Michael E. Marmura. “Translator’s Introduction,” in The Incoherence of the 
Philosophers (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 1997), xviii
5  Al-Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error, 55.
6  Watt W. Montgomery, “Introduction,” 14.
7  Al-Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error, 72-73.
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these arrogated philosophies and responds with basically theological 
arguments worded like philosophy: “[I] will dispute with them in this 
book in their own language—I mean, their expressions of logic.”8 In 
so doing, Ghazālī made no attempt to refute the Greek philosophers 
(Plato, Aristotle, Galen etc…). Rather, he opposed their translators: Ibn 
Sina (Avicenna) and al-Farabī. The work’s title refers to those Muslim 
philosophers whom Avicenna and al-Farabī inspired to new thought—but 
chiefly these two. Regardless, in refuting their claims, Ghazālī attempted 
no complete philosophical/theological system in response. In writing 
The Incoherence, he endeavored no resolution to these debates but only 
to show the ineptitude of the opposing side. In essence, he attempted to 
deflate the pride and inherent sense of superiority contemporary culture 
gave the philosophers.
  The work discusses twenty major points and subdivides them 
into more specific disputes. Of these the longest and the focus of this 
paper is the argument concerning the pre-eternity of the world. Put 
simply, is the world as old (co-eternal) as God? The philosophers argue 
yes—that the world has no temporal beginning. Ghazālī, divides their 
position into four major proofs and systematically refutes each of them. 
He constructs the work as a dialogue: the philosophers claim this, and 
he rebuts; they counter-rebut, and Ghazālī responds to that and so on.9 
One can perhaps think of the structure as an overly planned out coffee 
shop conversation. This paper simplifies and condenses the dialogue and 
furnishes examples more familiar to the modern mind.
 Despite the conflict inherent in such a work, and Ghazālī’s 
scathing report of those who blindly adhere to philosophy, he and the 
philosophers share a surprising amount of common ground. Ghazālī, 
at least in the first discussion, makes no attempt to refute Aristotelian 
science.10 He uses it as support or illustration in many of his arguments. 
8  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 9.
9  One should bear in mind the arguments of the philosophers come from Ghazālī. 
Averroes responded to Ghazali’s work with The Incoherence of the Incoherence, which 
contains a more balanced defense of the philosophers.
10  For more on Ghazālī’s treatment of Aristotelian science in regard to 
occasionalism versus Aristotelian causation see: Taneli Kukkonen, “Possible Worlds in 
the Tahâfut al-Falâsifa: Al-Gazâlî on Creation and Contingency.” Journal of the History of 
Philosophy 38, no. 4 (2000), http://muse.jhu.edu.
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In particular, he continually draws parallels to the Aristotelian 
perspective of space and compares it to his conception of time. 
 Further, the two sides argue over the nature of the material 
world—not of God. Each side attempts to support its conception of the 
universe without compromising certain qualities of the Divine. First, 
they both uphold the existence of the Divine. There are no atheists in this 
debate. Both contend that God created the material world but disagree 
about its temporal origin.11 Neither position will yield to accepting a 
weak God. He must be unchanging and omnipotent-as will be seen in the 
opening proof.12 Many of the arguments on both sides support the nature 
of the Divine while claiming the other side does otherwise. Basic logical 
ideas unite them further. Neither of them will accept an argument ending 
in an infinite regress, i.e., an endless row of dominos falling and causing 
one another to fall but having no beginning. Lastly, despite arguing over 
the definitions of possible, impossible, and necessary, which arise in the 
fourth major proof for the pre-eternity of the world, the opposing sides 
show a surprising amount of agreement in logical terminology.  
Proof I.
 Proof one addresses the philosophers’ argument that the 
eternal cannot produce the temporal. For the sake of ease, the dialogue 
here is divided into two major sections. The philosophers question 
God’s motivation in creating the world. Pictures when discussing the 
supernatural always present a danger, but for a moment think of this 
God sitting in nothingness. This Being is unchanging and all-powerful. 
No one and nothing could exist to ask Him, “Would you care to make 
man and the world today?” Thus, the only thing that can change in 
opinion or action is this God Himself. However, if God’s eternal character 
cannot change, than what stimulated the world’s creation? Nothing 
besides God could exist to motivate creation. Any change of will within 
11  Creation here means God is related to creation as a cause is to its effect. A cause 
need not come before the effect. For example, a muscle causes one’s limbs to move. Yet, the 
muscle and the limb move simultaneously.
12  However, omnipotence has a narrower definition here, which neither party states 
specifically. It does not mean God can do “anything,” rather, that He can do anything in the 
realm of possibility.  They both imply that God acts in coherence with logic. Neither resort 
to claiming God’s illogicality as explanation for his actions. I will discuss this further in the 
footnotes.
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God would defy His character—one of omnipotence and immutability: 
“To project a change of state [in the eternal] is impossible.”13 They 
argue, if all the conditions for a cause are met, its effect should come 
immediately. Further, if He had always willed the world’s creation, it 
should be coeternal with Him: having no beginning but nonetheless 
being caused by Him. The philosophers illustrate this by comparing it 
to a divorce. A man desiring divorce, who has fulfilled all the necessary 
paper work, will not delay in leaving his wife—since all the necessary 
conditions have been fulfilled. Similarly, in the state of pre-creation, 
only God’s will could inhibit His action. Hence, if he had always willed 
creation, all the “conditions” for the effect (creation) would be fulfilled. 
If so, this establishes the world’s eternity with Him. This idea of an 
effect proceeding immediately from its cause, the philosophers argue, 
is supported by “logical necessity, “ which seems to mean the logical 
conclusion of any unbiased mind.
 Ghazālī first responds to the philosophers’ conception of Divine 
will and then to their epistemological claim to know these things by 
“necessity.” Ghazālī illustrates the difference between Divine and 
human will saying human will “designate[s] that which has an objective 
[fulfilling a need] and there is never [such] an objective in the case of 
God.”14 He contends that Divine will differs from human will just as 
the philosophers argue that Divine and human knowledge differ. They 
uphold that the “‘eternal knowledge is not to be compared with created 
[knowledge],’”15 because they consider God a simple entity and contend 
that his knowledge does not count as a complexity in Himself. The 
philosophers define a “simple entity” as singular with no attributes within 
itself. Thus, to retain God’s simplicity and knowledge, the philosophers 
claim that knowledge is not an attribute—which would compromise His 
simplicity.16 Since human and godly knowledge differ, so also can human 
and godly will differ. Therefore, the philosophers cannot claim that godly 
will and action must happen simultaneously—as happens in human 
13  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 14.
14  Ibid, 23.
15  Ibid, 18.
16  Ghazālī disagrees with this perspective of God but chooses not to argue against it 
to any conclusion. 
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will. Ghazālī seems to imply here that God wills creation eternally, and 
integral in that will was a certain time for creation. 
 From this conception of God as both omniscient and simple, 
Ghazālī confronts the philosophers’ understanding by “logical necessity” 
and expands with two other examples. Ghazālī asserts that omniscience 
necessitates complexity. Indeed, people attribute intelligence or 
ignorance to each other frequently. While older age keeps such comments 
quiet or masked with nicer language, elementary school children will 
say things like, “He’s so dumb.” Certainly, saying so seems as much an 
attribution as indicating the color of one’s shirt. Thus, how can God be 
simple and omniscient? As an alternative, the philosophers may argue 
God has no knowledge of the world. However, “a maker who does not 
know his handiwork is necessarily impossible.”17 Yet, the philosophers 
claim their conception of God is known by “logical necessity.” 
 Ghazali refutes the philosophers’ claim of knowledge by necessity 
by citing other concepts they claim as known by “logical necessity.” They 
hold (by “logical necessity”) that all numbers must fall on an even or odd 
position. Yet, the world’s coeternity with God necessitates an infinite 
number of planetary rotations; and infinity has no designation of even 
or odd. It is neither. Earth must have a number of rotations, but it will 
be neither even nor odd. Therefore they erroneously claim by “logical 
necessity” that all numbers fall as even or odd. Further, Ghazālī cites 
Plato’s conception of the soul, which the philosophers uphold as known 
by “logical necessity.” They claim each separate soul will eventually 
reunite to the one God and become part of His simple essence. Ghazālī’s 
claims that “logical necessity” cannot comprehend this idea once put 
in other terms. How, he argues, can individuated self-aware beings 
be brought together in one simple aggregate?  The soul and seawater 
differ. Souls clash; they do not cohere as water does. Hence, Ghazālī 
reflects this idea of knowledge by “logical necessity” in opposition to the 
philosophers.18
 The second section of this first proof, which I have divided for 
the sake of ease, analyzes the nature of time and further discusses Divine 
17  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 18.
18  Ibid, 20.
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will. 
 Ghazālī begins by stating that God created both time and the 
material world through pure power of will; and that will discerned 
between moments of time to determine the proper time of creation. 
 The philosophers counter Ghazālī by citing his illogical definition 
of will and the indiscernible nature of time. Will does not determine 
between similarities. By similarities, the philosophers mean indiscernible 
things—like pitch-blackness. Trying to divide blackness into groups and 
categories is ridiculous. One cannot divide truly similar things.  So also 
dividing time—like pitch-blackness—into categories of pre- and post-
creation is ridiculous. “For the similarity of [temporal] states is known 
by [rational] necessity.”19 The philosophers give no specific definition of 
will but contend that reason chooses between two similarities that can 
be divided.20 Thus, a thirsty man with two identical glasses of water in 
front of him will select the one closest to his dominant hand. Will does 
not distinguish the two here; nor can it in the case of time. 21 Things are 
differentiated from one another by specifications: i.e., red and blue are 
both colors. Their redness or blueness specifies them. Nothing specifies 
one moment of time from another. Since will cannot differentiate 
between similarities, how can one claim God’s differentiation of time—
something that lacks specification? Because he cannot, time and material 
with it must be eternal. 
 Ghazālī continues to define will as “being an attribute whose 
function is to differentiate a thing from its similar.”22 Further, he claims 
that to maintain their perspective of the world, the philosophers must 
agree that time has differentiation. Ghazālī claims the will does function 
when faced with similar things. Again, the thirsty man with two identical 
19  Ibid, 24.
20  This actually bears a striking resemblance to the ancient and current debate 
over free will versus determination. To support free will demands that one define will, 
which proves very difficult. For more see: James Rachels. “The Debate over Free Will,” 
in Problems from Philosophy, Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic 
Problems of Philosophy, ed. Joel Feinberg and Russ Shafer-Landau (Belmont, CA: Thomas 
Wadsworth, 2008), 478-486.
21  This argument causes one to question what the philosophers and Ghazālī 
mean by “omnipotent.” If omnipotence can do anything, how then should it have trouble 
differentiating moments of time? Thus, it seems omnipotence refers only to the realm of 
logical possibility.
22  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 22.
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glasses of water before him, both of equal distance from both the man’s 
hands, could not decide between the two based on logic or anything else. 
Nor would he sit there, frozen with indecision, because of his reason’s 
inability to distinguish an advantage between the two. Rather, he would 
simply choose one. This, Ghazālī argues, is the function of will. Since will 
can logically discern between similarities, creation in time—with time 
preceding it—is possible. 
 He goes on to rebut the philosophers’ argument about the 
indiscernible nature of time in spatial terms. The shape of the world 
before creation could have been anything, even a trianglular Earth. 
Conversely, the philosophers maintain that the Earth could not be 
any shape other than spherical, and that shapes do have a sense of 
differentiation that time lacks. Ghazālī then references and uses as 
argument a shape they consider simple without differentiation: a sphere, 
as they suppose, is similar with no unequal parts, and this is known by 
“rational necessity.” This equality of the sphere is a vital part of their 
conception of the universe. The simple and ascending spheres indicate a 
God of infinite simplicity, which aligns with the Neo-Platonist perspective 
of God. Ghazālī attacks this by observing that the sphere has parts: in 
the case of the lowest sphere, it has poles. Thus, what the philosophers 
call similar in parts is not. They claim the same of time: that its equal 
parts allow no differentiation. By attacking their conception of a sphere’s 
equality, Ghazālī also steals support from their contending for time’s 
equality of parts, both of which are supposed to be known by “rational 
necessity”. 
 Ghazali further claims that the rotation of a sphere or planet 
“being circular and opposite are equivalent.”23 Either direction would 
yield little change in the world. The philosophers counter saying east to 
west differs from west to east obviously. Ghazālī ends this argument by 
comparing the philosophers’ notion of the difference in contrary motions 
of the spheres to the obvious difference inherent in the “priority and 
posteriority in terms of the world’s [coming into] existence….”24 Since 
they maintain that the spheres’ motion to the west or east counts as a 
23  Ibid, 27.
24  Ibid, 27.
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contrary, Ghazālī claims that creation at one time or another also counts 
as a contrary; and will can differentiate between contraries.
 Ghazālī’s last rebuttal to the philosophers analyzes causation, 
and should resound with familiarity to anyone well read in the 
foundations of western philosophy. He asserts that the philosophers’ 
argument must resort to an infinite regress.25 The world, by the 
philosophers’ logic, does not proceed from the Eternal but is eternal 
with Him. The world is thus composed of an infinite chain of temporal 
events: i.e., the grass grows because it has rained a lot lately. It has rained 
because the wind currents have brought humid air from the equator. The 
winds act as such because of consistent high- and low-pressure fields 
in the world, etc. And this causation has gone on for all eternity with 
temporal events causing one another without any beginning. Ghazālī 
maintains, however,  that an eternal causation must begin this chain of 
events, i.e., that a first (eternal) domino must fall to knock over the rest. 
And without that eternal domino, no effects or causes (other dominos 
falling) can come about. To this, the philosophers have no answer.
Proof II.
 The second proof deals primarily with time. Proof one takes for 
granted that time existed before creation and attempts to show that time 
has differentiation. Ghazālī now confronts the philosophers concerning 
God’s relation to time. They consider Him prior to creation in essence 
and cause—but not in time.26 Ghazālī opposes them by explaining God 
as prior in cause and time. He contends that “[t]ime is originated and 
created and before it there was no time at all.”27
 The philosophers counter Ghazālī by citing that one cannot 
conceive of something existing before time. Indeed, to say something 
exists “before” something else implies time. Thus, they claim Ghazālī has 
no real notion of his own argument. They continue their argument with 
an example of material creation before time. In this hypothetical, planets 
25  As stated in the introduction, accepted contemporary logic rejected infinite 
regression. David Hume in the 18th century argued otherwise, and it continues as a 
philosophical contention up to the present: David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1907), 119-122.
26  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, 30.
27  Ibid, 31.
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exist, but time does not. “Years” in this scenario are meaningless. They 
choose instead to cite the rotations of planets: planet “one” is made; it 
rotates 500 times, then planet “two” is created moving with equal speed 
and an equal distance as “one”. Given this distinction, neither can have 
the same number of rotations. This reasoning demands that a sort of 
demarcation exists even in the absence of time.
 Ghazālī dispatches these arguments by pointing out the mind’s 
inability to comprehend timelessness and that the philosophers’ 
hypothetical misses the point of his argument entirely. Ghazālī’s rebuttal 
here centers on spatial relations the philosophers accept, which support 
Ghazālī’s temporal perspective. Ghazālī states that no effort can unbind 
human comprehension from time. Human estimation cannot defy our 
temporal understanding: This estimative faculty “is specifically related 
with time and space.”28 However, time does not confine God. He created 
and masters time while humans, on the contrary, are subject to it. 
 As illustration, Ghazālī applies a spatial concept the philosophers 
consider necessary and existent: “[The philosophers] will then say, 
‘beyond the world there is neither a void nor filled space.”29 Such a 
concept defies human understanding. Imagine a room with nothing in it 
yet not empty; or one filled to the ceiling with furniture yet unoccupied. 
The idea cannot register with human reason—or what Ghazālī calls the 
estimative faculty. Hence, the philosophers must either accept a principle 
beyond human realization or deny their perspective of the universe.  
 Ghazālī addresses their hypothetical and frames it again in 
spatial terms. He asks if God could have made the spheres any thicker or 
thinner.30 If not, the philosophers compromise God’s omnipotence.31 If 
yes, this demands the space beyond the world have some measurement. 
Measurement in a space neither filled nor empty is senseless. So also 
28  Ibid, 35.
29  Ibid, 35.
30  Ibid, 38.
31  This section particularly shows a confined meaning of omnipotence. At one point 
the philosophers state: “We do not say that that which is not possible is within [divine] 
power. The world’s being greater or smaller than what it is is impossible. Hence, it is not 
within [divine] power” (p. 38) Ghazālī does not rebut their claim that omnipotence only 
functions within the realm of possibility. Rather, he argues that the “world’s being greater 
or smaller” is possible. It seems Ghazālī and the philosophers agree to a narrow definition 
of omnipotence.
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the rotations of the world/spheres as a measurement in place of time is 
senseless. The philosophers’ hypothetical remains subject to the limited 
estimative faculty and time. Ghazālī concludes that the philosophers 
must admit the possible creation of time or discard vital concepts of 
science within their own philosophy. If God can possibly create time, 
this further degrades the philosophers’ perspective of a pre-eternal 
world. Ghazālī attempts no explanation for the creation of time but only 
observes the flaws in the opposing position. And this is the work’s focus: 
to observe these flaws—not adduce a perfectly sound philosophical/
theological system in opposition. 
Proof III.
 The third proof primarily disputes the possibility of the world’s 
creation and how it reflects on God’s omnipotence. The philosophers 
assert that the world’s creation must have always been possible. After all, 
things do not shift from possibility to impossibility as the wind moves 
from east and then to west. Can one imagine a circle-square someday 
becoming possible? No. Impossibility or possibility, according to the 
philosophers, is an eternal attribute. They move away from this to a 
hypothetical: if the world at one time could not exist, and then at another 
it could, than this compromises God’s omnipotence. It implies that at 
some time or “temporal state,” God could not create the world.32
 Ghazālī agrees with their first contention but questions its basis. 
Yes, the world’s creation was always temporally possible; and therefore 
God’s omnipotence remains uncompromised. However, he observes that 
the philosophers deny the temporal creation of the world. Ghazālī’s other 
proofs attempt to disprove the world’s non-temporal creation. And thus 
he ends the argument stating that “[the temporally created world alone] 
is the possible, no other.”33 
Proof IV.
 The fourth proof hinges on semantics. It presents and debates 
logical terminology: possible, necessary, and impossible.  Impossible 
is either the juxtaposition of opposites (a circle square) or that which 
cannot ever exist. The necessary means it cannot but exist. The main 
32  Ibid, 40.
33  Ibid, 40.
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arguments revolve around the possible. How does one define possible? 
By one definition, the philosophers argue for the world’s pre-eternal 
nature while Ghazālī rebuts with another.
 The philosophers begin explaining that possibility requires a 
material connection or receptacle, but that material itself is eternal. 
Material here means an object always preceding and stripped of 
particulars: no form/shape, no color, no texture, etc. They consider 
particulars temporally originated and continue saying that one 
understands particulars (colors and shapes) only by observing physical 
forms. For example, one comes to learn shapes and colors (particulars) 
from looking at pictures (material) in elementary school. “Moreover, 
[possibility] is a relative description. It inevitably requires an entity 
to which to relate.”34 So the logic goes, one can only comprehend the 
possibility of blackness in an object if whiteness also exists. And since 
material—separate from any particulars—has no opposite, its origin must 
come before time.  For the possibility in the material world is obvious 
since it does in fact exist before one’s eyes. Remember, possibility is 
eternal, 35 but with no material receptacle, possibility would precede the 
world’s existence. How can possibility sustain itself without a subject? 
For example, how could the possibility of Icarus flying into the sun exist, 
if he did not exist? Since possibility requires a material subject and 
cannot sustain itself, the material world is eternal.
 Ghazālī counters by claiming a different conception of possibility 
and citing three examples of possibility apart from material. He defines 
possibility as “a judgment of the mind.” The mind apart from material 
can comprehend possibility. He illustrates this with three examples. 
Firstly, the impossible has no material receptacle. By definition it cannot. 
Yet, something can (possibly) be impossible. Secondly, the mind can 
comprehend colors without material objects. Once learned, one cannot 
distinguish between colors without material objects for them to color. 
Lastly, the philosophers’ conception of the soul will not conform to 
their definition of possibility, for they claim the soul subsists in itself 
without need of material or matter—that its possibility existed before 
34  Ibid, 41.
35  Ibid, 39.
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its creation.36 How then can an immaterial soul possibly exist if all 
possibilities must relate to material? Thus, Ghazālī cites flaws in their 
logic to support the world’s temporal origin.
 The remainder of the argument centers on these three examples, 
which each side attempts to use in support of one definition of possibility. 
The philosophers rebut Ghazālī’s examples and frame them to fit their 
own argument. The impossible does have a material receptacle. The 
philosophers explain that the impossible also means the juxtaposition 
of two contraries. For example, something cannot be red and not red 
at the same time. Since each contrary has a receptacle in material, so 
also the impossible has a receptacle in the material and thus remains 
possible. They maintain that to understand particulars (shapes, colors, 
textures, etc…) one must experience them first. Indeed, how could one 
comprehend a color without seeing an example of it in the material 
world.37 They argue the soul’s material receptacle is the body. The soul’s 
governance over the body gives it possibility. 
 Ghazālī ends the discussion by countering two of the opposing 
examples. He seems to concede to their definition of impossible—that 
the existence of contraries allows impossibility as a material receptacle 
and thus is possibility. He further allows some leeway regarding the 
comprehension of color. He asserts that the mind needs material 
examples to first understand color. However, the intellect can realize 
universals—which the philosophers acknowledge. For example, one 
cannot comprehend and keep straight all the varying shades of blue. 
However, one does have an understanding of blue as a general concept 
applicable to all those varying shades. Ghazālī contends that these 
universals exist solely in the mind. If universals exist solely as a judgment 
of mind, than their possibility must reside in the mind as well. Thus 
possibility is merely a judgment of the mind—not dependent on a 
material receptacle. 
 Ghazālī ends by denouncing the philosophers’ explanation of the 
36  Ibid, 42.
37  This hints at a philosophical definition for creativity: that creativity only 
recomposes already present material. For example, a painter cannot conjure up a fourth 
primary color. Rather he must work with the colors the present world offers.
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body as the material receptacle for the soul. If, as the philosophers claim, 
the soul’s possibility comes before its origination, possibility must exist 
without a material receptacle.38 To claim the body as a soul’s material 
receptacle is far-fetched considering that the soul, by the philosophers’ 
definition, is “neither in a body nor matter and [is] not imprinted in 
matter.” If the soul does not even imprint upon matter, how then can one 
claim the body as its material receptacle? The discussion ends here where 
Ghazālī affirms that the philosophers must either change their own 
conception of the universe and soul or accept his definition of possibility, 
which allows for the temporal origination of material. The first discussion 
here concludes with the purpose of Ghazālī’s writing: “To muddy [the 
philosophers’] doctrine and throw dust in the face of their proofs with 
that which would reveal their incoherence.”39
 Despite the rather esoteric nature of this debate, it depicts a 
culture more intellectually active than many would think. It produced 
men like Ghazālī, who show a command of both religious thought and 
philosophical cunning. Currently, society separates the religious and the 
learned. Ghazālī’s writings defy this distinction. He had command of both 
religious and secular knowledge, yet remained a pious man. His ability to 
balance such delicate understanding remains rare. He held that one must 
poke into every dark recess, assault every problem and scrutinize the 
creed of every sect.40 Monotheists, polytheists, spiritualists, and atheists 
alike would do well to seek understanding of their opposition as Ghazālī 
did in writing The Incoherence of the Philosophers. 
38  Ibid, 45.
39  Ibid, 46.
40  Al-Ghazālī, Deliverance from Error, 20
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